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Opposing authoritarianism 
I am grateful to Michael Peters for stepping in at the last minute when I was unable to make 
it to Beijing. And I am grateful for the opportunity to respond to his reflections on the 
educational good, which he formulated with reference to ideas from my book Good Education 
in an Age of Measurement: Ethics, Politics, Democracy (Biesta 2010), marking the occasion of 
the publication of the Chinese translation of this book. Michael makes a strong case for a 
contextual answer to the question of good education and the good of education, which he 
contrasts with what he characterises as my ethical, non-contextual and, in a sense, even 
foundational approach. I fully agree that questions about what makes education good, what 
counts as good education, and what constitutes educational goods, cannot be determined in 
abstracto, and cannot and should not be decided ex cathedra, that is, from some 
authoritarian position. On  that point I think that we fully agree.  
 
Actually, my case for bringing the question of the good of education back into the educational 
conversation was precisely motivated by developments that did try to determine what good 
education is in a rather authoritarian and de-contextualised manner. I was particularly 
responding to the suggestion that education should be about the effective production of a 
narrow set of measurable ‘learning outcomes.’ This idea has been pushed explicitly over the 
past decades by a global educational measurement industry in which the OECD has managed 
to make itself a key-player (for an excellent analysis see D’Agnese, 2017). By suggesting, as is 
implied in such measurements, that education is ‘all about learning,’ without ever asking the 
question what such learning actually is, what educational learning is supposed to be about 
and supposed to be for, and who should have a say in answering these questions, the global 
educational measurement industry has actually promoted a very specific definition of 
education’s good, without ever articulating this definition explicitly, let alone providing a 
justification for it. Moreover, it has managed to do so in a very seductive way (Biesta, 2015[a]) 
– particularly seducing politicians and policy makers, but also the wider public – by tapping 
into populist ideas about the alleged ‘basics’ of education and the suggestion that large-scale 
measurement can relieve us from difficult normative and political questions about the 
content, form and direction of what happens in schools, colleges and universities.  
 
What is particularly helpful about Michael’s reflections is that he shows that the webs in 
which education appears to be caught, have, over the past decade, become even more 
complex and multi-faceted, with new forms of control replacing older forms of discipline. 
What his reflections also show, is that such developments are never simply acting upon 
education from the outside – which would rely on the too simplistic assumption that 
education starts out as some kind of uncontaminated ‘space’ that subsequently has become 
colonised – but emerge from the  very inside of educational practices and policies as well. this 
is often done with the promise that if we have more data, more information, more 
monitoring, and more innovation, education will become better, either for some, but there is 
always also the promise in the background that educational innovation will eventually benefit 
everyone in equal message – the promise of equal opportunities for all (on the complexities 
of this promise see Biesta, in press[a]). 
 
 
On the terms of critique 
One important question in relation to these developments is what kind of ‘push back’ is 
needed and also what kind of ‘push back’ is possible. This is the question of critique, and I 
continue to believe that part of our work as academics is to articulate critique and provide 
resources for the wider educational field to engage in their own forms of critique, resistance 
and re-articulation of what happens and should be happening in education. My own 
suggestion to return to the question of good education, rather than spend all efforts and 
resources on the effectiveness of education, has been one such critical intervention. More 
specifically, by suggesting that the question of what education is for can never be answered 
in a mono-dimensional way, but always needs to engage with the three-fold ‘remit’ of 
education – the work of qualification, the work of socialisation, and the work of what I have 
termed subjectification (see Biesta 2010; in press[b]) – I have tried to provide the field of 
education with a language for engaging with the discussion about education’s good in a more 
precise, sufficiently complicated and, in my view, adequately educational manner. This is not, 
then, an attempt to define what education should be about from the outside, in an 
authoritarian way, or without a sense of context, but about generating resources with which 
the discussion can be carried out better than just talking about ‘measurement,’ ‘outcomes’ 
and ‘effectiveness’ – the concepts that continue to dominate the discussion and, as I have 
tried to argue, are actually undermining meaningful debate about the goods of education. 
 
One thing I wish to emphasise about my proposal that any discussion about the goods of 
education and about what makes education good should take into consideration three 
domains of purpose – qualification, socialisation and subjectification – is that it seeks to 
highlight a properly educational engagement with the question of the goods of education. I 
am aware, and have written about this elsewhere (see Biesta, 2011), that the use of the 
adjective ‘educational’ is not very common in the English language and within the history of 
the field of education in the English-speaking world. Whereas in the English speaking world 
education is often seen as an object of study for educational research and a relatively ‘neutral’ 
institution for education policy makers – which means that both researchers and policy 
makers ‘approach’ education from the ‘outside,’ so to speak  -- the Continental approach 
takes a more ‘interested’ approach, starting from the assumption that education is about the 
encounter between the generations in which the freedom of the new generation is at stake. 
Here education is not seen as an instrument for the realisation of external goals, purposes or 
ambitions, but refers to those practices and interactions, to put it briefly, that have an 
orientation towards the emancipation of the one’s being educated. For this reason, it is 
possible to ask how educational schools or education systems are, that is, to what degree 
they do not just function as systems of cultural or social reproduction, but also contribute to 
ways in which students can be agents or subjects of their own life – the theme of 
subjectification. 
 
To articulate the educational interest in this way is of course fraught with difficulties, and it is 
important for educational scholars to continue the conversation about what might constitute 
the educational interest, how it might be articulated and, most importantly, how it might be 
justified. This work, which has been going on at least since 1762, the year in which Rousseau 
published his Emile (Rousseau, 1979), does seek to identify and articulate what is properly 
educational about education. In doing so, it attempts to overcome educational functionalism, 
that is, the idea that education should just do what ‘others’ – be it politicians, be it societal 
groups, be it big business, be it the church, be it parents, be it students themselves – would 
want it to do. Also, it seeks to overcome an all too ethical determination of education, one in 
which it is suggested that ethics should provide the aims of education and psychology or 
effectiveness research the (effective) means for achieving those aims. The interest in and 
search for the ‘educational’ seeks to articulate education’s own interest, so to speak, which 
has something to do with safeguarding the freedom of children, young people, pupils and 
students to lead their own life or, in the terms of Hannah Arendt, safeguarding their natality, 
their capacity for beginning something new (see Arendt 1977). Such an interest can, of course, 
not be justified in a general, foundational or a-contextual way. Its ‘sense’ rather is contextual 
and, more specifically, historical, as it refers to all those situations from our recent history 
where freedom, particularly the freedom to begin something new, was denied, was seen as a 
problem, as an option that needed to be suppressed and eradicated rather then nourished 
and protected. This theme is older than a reflection on the atrocities of the 20th century but 
for our time it is at least connected to Adorno’s call that ‘after Auschwitz’ the first demand 
upon all education is that Auschwitz will not happen again (see Adorno 1971). 
 
Pushing back, educationally  
Articulating such an educational ‘vantage point’ is first of all important in order to be able to 
push back against the apparent ‘common sense’ of contemporary education, particularly as 
it has been ‘promoted’ – and the word ‘promoted’ is probably a bit too soft given the 
devastating impact it has had around the world – by the global education measurement 
industry. As long as we think of education as merely a function of society, there is no way in 
which education can be defended when society, or powerful forces within society, decides to 
utilise it for particular ends – be it to become the most competitive knowledge-based 
economy in the world (an ambition articulated by Europe in recent years, or equipping all 
‘learners’ with the 21st century skills they need to flexibly adapt to an uncertain future 
(another popular ambition in many countries that never seems to be concerned with the 
question whether everything we will encounter in the future simply asks from everyone to 
adapt and adjust to it; see Biesta, 2015[b]). To claim that education has its own integrity, its 
own interest, its own concern, is crucial in order to push back against all tendencies to 
approach and (ab)use education as a mere function, a mere ‘instrument’ that  can be put to 
work for any agenda. 
 
This is also important for the theme that is central in Michael’s essay – that of innovation. 
Education, world-wide, suffers from an obsession with the new, with renewal, and with the 
assumption that what is new is better, and hence what is not new, what is old, must be worse 
or bad. The demand for educational innovation not only puts a relentless pressure on 
education to constantly keep up, constantly go for the latest fashion, without providing much 
time for careful judgement about what is on offer and about what is actually needed. Fashion 
is the appropriate word here, because the whole point of fashion – and of the ever faster 
cycles by which the fashion industry produces its collections – is not to meet the needs of 
consumers, but constantly generate more wants, generate more desire for the latest fashion, 
also on the suggestion that if one doesn’t opt for the latest fashion one will be behind of those 
who do ‘keep up.’ The analysis here is not very difficult, and the environmental problems 
caused by ‘fast fashion’ are beginning to create awareness of the fundamental problem here, 
at least where it contains clothing. Hopefully this is going to help in the field of education as 
well, particularly in order to expose that the ‘new’ is not necessarily or automatically that 
which serves the educational point of schools, colleges and universities best.  
 
Michael is also acutely aware that such a ‘technocratic’ conception of education – he 
characterises it as an economic view – is deeply problematic. Yet rather than blocking 
innovation altogether which, I agree, is impossible to do anyway, he opts for an alternative 
view and an alternative practice, if I understand him correctly, which he refers to as social 
innovation. Is this a desirable future, for society and for education? I am less optimistic than 
Michael seems to be, and perhaps the main reason for this has to do with his mainly positive 
appreciation of ‘openness,’ that is, of ‘openness’ generally being a force for the good. I am 
not sure, and I am perhaps also not entirely sure how sure Michael himself is. Yes, if openness 
is linked to radical social democracy, then openness can be a force for the good – for 
furthering the case of freedom and equality and thus democracy itself. But this requires a 
particular ‘quality’ of openness, a particular ‘orientation,’ a particular ‘concern,’ and without 
this concern openness can, in my view, go in many directions, of which democracy is only one. 
 
The ten core principles of social media he lists, for example, can support developments that 
are desirable from the perspective of democracy, but can also do the opposite. Self-organising 
social structures are, after all, not automatically clustered around valued of equality and 
solidarity; the can also cluster around racism, (neo-)Nazism, and so on. Personalisation can 
tailor processes to the preferences of individuals, but says nothing about the quality or 
orientation of such preferences. Virtual communities in which relationships are sought, can 
work for the common good or for spreading terror. ‘Swarm intelligence’ or a ‘global brain’ 
remind me more of Ortega y Gasset’s ‘masses’ than of democratic grass roots movements. 
The question, then, is how such open processes can gain or maintain a sense of direction. And 
here I would suggest that, at least where it concerns education, we need to keep working on 
meaningful articulations and justifications of the ‘educational’ – knowing that as soon as we 
give up this quest other forces will enter the scene. And this is perhaps the biggest problem 
we are already facing today, in education and society at large. The challenge, then, is how we 
can continue the practice of critique, without becoming foundational or fundamentalist and 
without thinking that ‘strong’ ethics provides the way out. Ongoing reflection on what makes 
education educational may at least provide part of what we need today. 
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